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A Roundtable Discussion with
Lawrence Lessig, David G. Post & Jeffrey Rosen
Moderated and Edited by
Thomas E. Baker*
PROFESSOR BAKER: When I imagined the schedule for this morning, I
looked forward to this portion of the program very much. I wanted to have an
opportunity to hear our speakers interact with each other and with us. This is a
chance to get inside their heads. My role as a moderator reminds me of a story,
perhaps apocryphal, which is told about General Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall"
Jackson during the Civil War. Jackson had a lieutenant on his staff who was
obviously not very talented. He did not have any kind of battle experience and
he was a rather dull fellow. All the other officers on Jackson's staff were razor-
sharp, talented, and battle-tested. Someone finally got up the courage to ask
Jackson why he kept this fellow around, and the General replied, "Well, when I
write out a field order I show it to him before I send it out. If he can understand
it, then anyone can." That is how I see my modest role as the moderator. We are
taping this program, as you may have noticed, so I would ask you to speak loud
enough for others to hear and for the microphones to pick up your question or
comments. Who will begin our Roundtable Discussion?
QUESTION: I have a question for Professor Rosen, and perhaps the others, too.
You talked about the "legalized self." I want to ask about what we have been
talking about more generally this morning-how is Internet going to impact upon
the political self--on our political institutions, the institutions of representative
government?
PROFESSOR ROSEN: I guess there is some connection between the legalized
self and the erosion of political authority. This was one of Tocqueville's points,
although I think he didn't anticipate the degree to which courts themselves would
be undermined and polarized, as they increasingly were forced to take sides in
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these social disputes. He envisioned lawyers as being a respected class-with
their focus on backward-looking events in history, being able to adjudicate things
that political passions couldn't resolve. I noticed there was a bit of a start in the
room when I talked about the self-immolation of the Supreme Court in Bush v.
Gore' because this is, of course, an issue about which people have very polarized
feelings. But it is an example of the fact that when the courts do declare
themselves in these increasingly controversial issues, they may find their
authority undermined. So, I would fear that we can look forward to more
polarization, more erosion of governmental authority. It's a phenomenon, to the
degree that it's linked to the logic of democracy, that will get worse and worse.
The solution to this problem? I think the same self-restraint I was talking about
in the sphere of personal manners might counsel some form of judicial restraint
as well and a recognition that it is really by conserving and hording its authority
that the Court has been most respected. It has been when it has spoken
unanimously in cases like Nixon2 and Brown3 that it has been able to summon
contending sides of the country to some mutually acceptable resolution. So, I
would hope that deference in the face of contestable social judgments would be
something that courts would take from this experience and courts would resist the
inclination to continue to interject themselves into these essentially social
disputes.
PROFESSOR POST: I have a comment-a somewhat different perspective on
that question. One of the things I think that is happening on the Net is that it is a
global medium, and we are all sort of coming to terms with what that means.
You know, my Web site is accessible to anybody all over the globe, and all
points on the Net are sort of equidistant from one another and boundary crossing
and all that. It has already become somewhat of a clich6, but it is true. And I
think when we talk about representative democracy and representative
institutions, one of the things I think about is that in a global place like this there
has been enormous pressure, and there will continue to be enormous pressure, for
global lawmaking institutions of some kind. Harmonizing law across boundaries.
There is going to be and has been enormous pressure to do that, for example, on
the copyright front, on the trademark front, and with respect to securities
regulation. Everybody is talking internationally and globally. We don't have
good existing institutions to do that. I think that there is a problem, again. The
Founders thought a lot about this problem of scale. Can you design
institutions-they had these institutions for the 13 colonies, and there was a
serious discussion about whether they would scale across the United States.
1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Could we have a federal union that stretched from the Atlantic to Pacific? And a
lot of people, smart people, thought we could not. Hamilton among them. They
really didn't see how these institutions could work-you know, people out there
in Ohio are going to be boozing it up, and they won't pay their taxes, and how
will we ever. ... And I think the problem of scale in governmental institutions
is one we have to think about again, because I don't see any good solutions, right
now at least, to how we build global institutions that have the trust of the people
who are subjected to their rules and regulations. I think this is related to what we
might call the Seattle phenomenon (or the WTO protests), if you will. I think
there is a very real phenomenon that is going to play itself out on the Net as
people ask themselves: Who or what are these international institutions who
have the authority to make the rules for this global environment? It's an essential
problem and a very difficult one.
QUESTION: Along the lines of talking about globalization, I want to ask
Professor Post whether or not we can expect that there will be an increasing
source of international regulations, regulations by foreign countries that might
affect us here in the United States. Let me give you two specific examples: the
Yahoo incident with Nazi memorabilia and the French government saying "you
can't make that accessible to the people in France because it violates our laws"-
and Yahoo's response. And also an example that Professor Lessig has written
about: the "icraveTV" situation in which a Canadian company that, consistent
with Canadian law, rebroadcast television shows on the Internet.4 Then some
Hollywood interests go into a federal court in Pittsburgh saying that some
Americans had access to that despite blocking efforts. And they argued that the
only way to prevent Americans from having access to that was to shut down the
site altogether. Is that the sort of thing we can expect to be affected by in this
country, and also will our government's decisions in similar situations affect
other countries?
PROFESSOR POST: I think the answer is "yes." "Yes" in the sense that what
you are describing is something we can expect a great deal more of-that's going
to be a central source of tension and debate and conflict on the Net for the
foreseeable future. In the Yahoo case-most of you probably know-Yahoo was
sued in France for violating a French law that prohibits the exhibit of Nazi
memorabilia. The French court issued an injunction against them, reaching out
beyond its borders and at least asserting that the injunction reached the operation
of Yahoo, Inc., which is a California corporation and a California Web server,
4. Lawrence Lessig, The Standard, Cyberspace Prosecutor <http://www.thestandard
.con/articarticle_print/0,1 153,10885,00.html> (Feb. 21, 2000).
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saying that, because you are sending this material into France, we can reach out
over our borders and grab you and make you subject to our laws. I think that's a
very serious threat to two values. One is the value of free expression, although,
of course, the French will say, "we believe in free expression. We just draw a
line differently than you might in America, but we have good reason to do that."
And it is a threat to the value of the consent of the governed. The assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction like that, I think, always raises the question: What
gives the French authority over someone who is outside their borders and has had
no participation in making that law about Nazi memorabilia? I think that those
efforts should be resisted for the sake of the spread of expression on the Net. If
the French want to put filters on their own Internet service providers, I have
nothing to say about that, quite franily. That's their business. But if they want
to stop Yahoo from displaying this, which affects me in the United States
because now I can't get access to this material either, then I think that ought to be
resisted.
PROFESSOR LESSIG: The resolution, though, that happens in the case of
icraveTV and also is being proposed in the Yahoo case is the use of technologies
that make it possible to identify where something comes from, so the result
would be: if you are a French citizen using Yahoo, then you could not get access
to Nazi paraphernalia, but if you are a United States citizen, you could get access.
Now, in some sense, that responds to part of what David Post is concerned about.
But I think both David and I are anxious about that response itself, because one
feature of the Internet that many people celebrated originally was the sense in
which it created a space where people could communicate and exchange ideas
independent of local geography. And I think the central argument in the first part
of my book is, basically, that is a dying characteristic of cyberspace.
Increasingly, cyberspace will become a place where your rights and abilities will
be a function of your citizenship or the citizenship you are able to demonstrate
you hold, and that will make it increasingly "zoned" in the way that real space is
zoned, to have different rights depending on where you come from.
PROFESSOR POST: Forgive me for thinking this is not unlike carving up the
new world. I mean, they did that too. They drew a line. They imported old
boundaries, in a sense-the old sovereignty of the old world was simply mapped
onto the new world, and they drew a line-Spain gets this territory and Portugal
gets that territory. We have a medium in which those lines are not apparent, and
it has shown us in ten years that that is extraordinarily powerful. How wonderful
it is that we can communicate across boundaries and form new forms of fluid
communities of interest across national boundaries. To reimpose the boundaries
of the "real world," if you will, onto this medium, we can probably do it-I think
that is correct. We have the technology. We could re-jigger this network so that
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there is a French part of cyberspace and there is an American part of cyberspace
and there is a Philadelphia part of cyberspace, so that it looks like the real world.
I can't imagine why we would want to do that. Why would we forego the
opportunity of seeing what a truly global world is like and the opportunities that
it presents?
QUESTION: I am curious about the panelists' own theories and arguments.
What do you believe are the ramifications from the fact that there is some
resistance to technology and also some lack of accessibility to technology?
Resistance from people like my Grandma, who doesn't necessarily want to get on
the computer, and the concerns being expressed about the lack of accessibility of
people in lower socioeconomic groups. What are the ramifications from those
two facts?
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Well, to the degree that this democratic space relies on
the participation of all, I suppose we would really worry about growing class
divisions between the wired and the not-wired. I'm not a Net utopian. There is
no reason not to have some pluralism here. If the studies are correct, which
suggest that the Net is more of an amplifier rather than a substitute for real space
interactions, then it is just as foolish to assume that putting a terminal in every
classroom is a substitute for traditional learning as it is to assume that free access
is a complete solution. So, I would tolerate some diversity of usage, at least in
the beginning.
PROFESSOR POST: Consider this. We know over 99% of American house-
holds have television. It is extraordinary, really, when you think of it. It is
ubiquitous. It's cheap. People seem to like it. I have one. I like it. I think we
always should be worried about any unequal distribution of resources, but, quite
frankly on this one, I am not all that worried. Since the issue surfaced two or
three years ago, and people started talking about it, the price of a machine to have
Internet access has dropped dramatically. You can get a $399 box now. That is
practically like a TV, almost. It will be there in a couple of years. Many people
who don't have one don't think there is anything out there that they are terribly
interested in, and maybe they are right. The choice not to participate always is
open to people. I think most people will not make that choice over time. In a
sense, to me, this is a simple problem because it is largely about whether to spend
money, whether to subsidize the purchase of Internet-ready boxes. I think that is
probably unnecessary because I think this is one place where the market is
functioning incredibly well. And it is the best way to drive cost down and get
99% of the American households to have Internet access in a few years, which is
what I suspect will happen.
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PROFESSOR LESSIG: I want to disagree. There is one flaw in where we are
going that I think will make this increasingly a problem. There is a guy named
Nicholas Negroponte, who is a theorist from MIT, who came up with the idea
called the "Negroponte switch."5 He said that everything that is going across the
wires will soon be wireless, and everything that is wireless will soon be on the
wires, and that is what the future is about. That is true in the context of Internet
access, too. There already are technologies for sharing spectrum-spread
spectrum technology or ultra-wideband spread spectrum technologies-that
could give very cheap, very, very fast Internet access to a large group of people
almost immediately. One guy pushing this is a guy named Duane Hendricks,
who used to work for the FCC. He finally got tired of the FCC's bureaucracy
and said, "I'm going to go out and build myself a spread spectrum network." His
lawyers said, "You can't do it in the United States." So, he went to the Kingdom
of Tongo, and he persuaded the prince of Tongo that he should be allowed to use
spectrum as he wants in Tongo, and he did. They set up this system to give faster
Internet access over the air than you can buy from AT&T or from any broadband
supplier right now. The essence is that, in Tongo, you just pay for the equip-
ment, which is falling very quickly, as the market supports it, to $100-$150.
Then you get fast, 11-megabits-a-second Internet access for free. Now, Duane
then says, in effect, "we should be able to have this in the United States." He and
my clinic at Stanford are now going to six Native American tribes in the United
States and, as part of their college programs, we are going to set up these spread
spectrum networks on these Native American reservations and then go to the
FCC and say to the FCC, "We are sovereign nations and we can order our
spectrum the way we want, and we are just telling you that this is the way we are
ordering our spectrum." And they will get essentially free Internet access across
the air. This is being resisted outside of Tongo and outside of these Native
American tribes because there is an alternative way the spectrum is being
allocated right now. The big move was to get away from the government
licensing spectrum and to get to the market licensing spectrum. Both of these are
ways of allocating spectrum use, as opposed to the way the Internet allocates
access to resources, which is just to open it up and let people use it as they need
it. And so there is this race to sell off spectrum, which will be used by existing
businesses like Lucent Technologies and Motorola to protect their way of doing
business against the Duane Hendricks types and ideas like his. There is a very
particular example where this is happening currently in the bill that finances Net
5. See Nicholas Negroponte, Wireless Revisited <http://www.media.mit.edu/-nicholas
/Wired/WIRED5-08.html> (Aug. 1997).
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access for schools-the McCain bill.6 The proposal says, "we're going to wire
the schools"--and they mean literally "wire" the schools. So, people would
come forward with wireless technology and say, "Instead of spending half a
million dollars running wires from a certain place into a school and running it
around the school, let's set up this spread spectrum technology." It was written
into the bill that this was not possible, however. You had to use actual wires, and
that meant that the program was going to send money back to the cable providers
or to the telecom companies instead of paying anyone using the spectrum
technology. So, that's a way of tilting the market to create scarcity that might
cause this problem when, right now, so long as it is on the regulated wires, it
doesn't matter.
QUESTION: Our record predicting the impact on society from technologies-
the automobile, the phone, and so forth-has not been particularly good. I want
to ask each of you what gives you the most concern about what you have talked
about today-where you might be wrong or where you might end up years from
now and say, "why didn't I see it coming"? We've had fairly optimistic reports,
or notions that what we are doing seems right. But what are the red flags that
you see in your own thoughts?
PROFESSOR POST: My thought is completely free of all red flags.
[LAUGHTER]
PROFESSOR POST: That is a hard question.
PROFESSOR LESSIG: There is a great essay by Bill Joy in Wired Magazine.
If there is a "foundational father" in this stage, he is certainly one. He worked for
Sun. He sort of developed Unix as a standard that was spread widely among
universities. Joy wrote this piece about the dangers of the future, and it's a really
terrifying piece.7 He talks about how the technologies we are developing for the
control of nano-technologies-the control of things at the smallest level-are
liable to get out of hand so quickly as to completely redefine what it means to be
human. So, he talks about devices that get integrated into humans that are out
there and being developed right now. Very quickly, before we realize it, we will
have transformed the meaning of things that are to us, right now, very taken-for-
6. FY2001 Labor, Health and Human Services and Educations Appropriations Act,
H.R 4577, 106th Cong. (2000).
7. Bill Joy, Why the Future Does Not Need Us <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive
/8.04/joy_pr.html> (Apr. 2000).
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granted. Now, sometimes I try to convince myself to be worried the way Joy is,
because he certainly is smarter than I am, and he knows this stuff much better.
Although maybe it is just a rare moment of optimism that I have, I sort of ignore
it and say that's not really something that we have to worry about any more than
people worried about whether to stop science 20 years ago, or 50 years ago, or a
hundred years ago.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: I am worried about the phenomenon of group polari-
zation. I painted a kind of sunny picture about how democratic shaming can
operate in a world where people disagree about standards of behavior merely
because of the incentives to get good reputations. But this recent experience that
we see with the Supreme Court is not only distressing because it is bad when a
trusted branch of government finds its authority undermined. It just may be
harder and harder as society gets more democratic for people to escape from the
prisons of their own partisan preconceptions. So, Cass Sunstein, in his
interesting new book REPUBLIC. COM,8 discusses the surprising phenomenon
that juries, after deliberations, will often arrive at damage verdicts higher than
that named by any individual juror before the deliberations began. People get
more extreme after deliberations. Why is this? There are two reasons, he says.
Ordinarily, when groups without strong positions deliberate, people in the
extremes can move to the middle. That's why in presidential campaigns we have
centrist candidates. But when you have groups where people have pretty strong
positions in advance, after deliberations the opposite happens. The means move
to the extremes for two reasons. First, because people in polarized groups don't
want to be unpopular with their friends. They like to signal that they are a
member of the "good group." And even if they have doubts about the legal
merits of the position, or the political merits, they will emphasize their certainty.
That's why after Election Day we saw the country behaving like polarized
molecules moving more firmly towards the positions they were only tentative
about on November 4th. And the second is an informational problem. When you
have isolated groups, people just don't get to hear arguments from the other side.
So, once the dispute becomes legalized, the different teams will form into armed
camps, and they just won't listen to opposite information that might change their
points of view. This is a strong challenge to my more hopeful notion that
democratic reputation mechanisms on the Net can lead to healthy social
consensus and to the new formation of manners. Because if it is true that we are
able to self-select and become more atomized, to basically interact only in spaces
that confirm our preconditioning and biases, and if these biases do become more
extreme as we spend time in these isolated groups, then the very social costs of
8. CASS SUNSEIn, REPUBuC.COM (2001).
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the "legalized self' that I discussed might become all the more acute on the Net
as we become more separate, resentful, polarized, and exaggerated. The laments
about the criminalization of politics, the increased acerbicness and the lack of
civility in public life have all become trite now. But it would be distressing,
wouldn't it, if this logic of democracy were to infiltrate not only our political life,
but social life, and to make us more separate, more resentful, and more polarized
as a result? So, I am very concerned about this.
PROFESSOR POST: I was only kidding, by the way. Let the transcript reflect
that when I said there are no red flags in my thinking I was just joking. Will I be
able to amend my remarks?
PROFESSOR BAKER: Yes. Just like in Congress....
PROFESSOR POST: Thank you. There is the Orwellian vision that I think we
have to keep in mind. I mean, we have to keep that in front of us. I think the
technologies do allow a kind of control that can be monopolized-whether or not
it is the state, Big Brother, that is, whether it is in public or private hands, I sort
of agree is not the central question. The central question is whether there is some
central authority that is in control of how this network develops. But then I think
there could be. I'm worried about internationalization of law for that reason.
Imagine a "world's copyright law"-if there were such a thing-that would
resemble the copyright law of individual countries which already exist on behalf
of individuals to protect and enforce property rights for private gain. The
pressure at the international level will be a hundredfold greater, and the
institutions at the international level are a hundred times less likely to resist that
pressure because they really haven't been built to do that, and they haven't faced
that kind of pressure before. So, I'm deeply concerned about a world copyright
law that would fix some particular principles in place in the future and forever
afterward. I want to say one thing, too, when you ask what might be wrong with
my own thinking, where am I going to look back and say, "I screwed that one
up." One does get a kind of humility immersing oneself in Thomas Jefferson's
work, not the obvious humility as "Geez, he's ten times smarter than I am." It's
not even that. It's that Jefferson was so wrong about a lot of things. He was an
indispensable party, if you will, to the formation of the United States. But on the
other hand, if it all went his way-there was a lot of wacky stuff in what he was
proposing. A lot of it. He needed Hamilton, who himself had a lot of wacky
stuff in what he was proposing. He needed Madison. They needed each other.
There is a wonderful book by Joseph Ellis, Founding Brothers,9 about the
9. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS-THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION (2000).
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network of relationships among the people who were most instrumental in
forming the United States. And I think this notion of everybody playing-off one
another is critical, because no one vision has it right. No one vision will ever
have it right. And I'm sure mine doesn't have it right. And even to the extent
that I am capturing Jefferson's vision, I am sure there are terrible holes in it.
There is an inevitable need for a kind of tension and playing-off of other visions.
When I was talking to my son the other day about the environmental movement,
I said there are a lot of wacky things going on in the environmental movement.
But you need them. They redefine the debate. You need people going out there
and chaining themselves to the trees. I wouldn't do it. I think it's not good
public policy. But it moves the debate along in a way. It is a vision that gets
introduced into the debate, notwithstanding the fact that there are plenty of holes
in it. It makes other people look at the debate in different ways. That's all one
can hope to do in a sense. I'm sure that if I were running the Internet, it wouldn't
be a particularly great place. I'm sure of it because I don't understand what's
coming over the next hill any better than anybody else does. But it is in the
interplay of people with individual coherent visions that are different through
which everybody gets to have their own vision of what the spaces should look
like.
QUESTION: You have suggested that it is possible for existing governments to
assert their sovereignty onto cyberspace. You have mentioned the possibility that
some international entities, that might broker competing sovereignties, might
prove equal to the task of "governing the Internet." What are these entities and
how will they work? What is the source of law that we will apply to the Internet?
Who will decide these individualized disputes?
PROFESSOR POST: I think that's a very good question, a very important
question. The existing international system that we have provides a source of
law, and the temptation is to rely upon that because I can't point to other institu-
tions in the sense that work better. I sort of put myself at a disadvantage. I don't
know what the other institutions are that might work better. Think for a moment
about the uniform dispute resolution procedure that ICANN (Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) has set up for trademark law.
For the disputes between trademark owners and domain name holders, there is
now a private system of arbitration that, in effect, is mandatory for all domain
name holders worldwide. If someone claims a domain name is infringing their
trademark, the dispute goes into this private system, at least for an initial
resolution. That's a source of law. That's a new kind of institution that did not
exist a few years ago. It makes a tiny slice of global trademark law-just the
trademark law that deals with domain names--but it is still a little slice of global
trademark law. I continue to think it was an experiment worthy of undertaking to
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see how it would work. Is it a good institution or a bad one? Is it making good
law or is it making bad law? Is it set up well or is it set up poorly? That's all we
can do. I happen to think that the way that the UDRP (Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Process) has functioned up to now-I could go on for hours
about things I think are wrong with it-I think we could design it better-I think
its skewed toward trademark holders--I think it has no precedent-there are a lot
of problems with the way it has been designed. But, nonetheless, the experiment
I think was a noble one in a sense. I mean, that's the thing. We have to have lots
of that kind of activity and innovation going on in order to help us think about
institutions which can plausibly make legal rules in this environment. Many will
be failures. We will come upon some that are not failures, and eventually by
consensus we will build upon those. This is new territory. So, no one can point
to a set of alternatives that is particularly good right now. I don't think that is a
reason for saying, "Well, then, I guess we'll go with the horse that brung us."
We should not impose the legal system that is already in place-a sort of
geographical sovereignty-onto this network. I don't think that's the right
answer either.
QUESTION: Regarding the regulation of content on the Internet, the existing
technology allows both for monitoring sites and for gathering information about
users, to limit or to allow access to certain types of information-about sex,
about triple-X pornography, for example. And the technology will exist on
"Internet2" to create an individual passport that reveals whether or not that
particular person should have access to this or that sort of site. Is that the
direction we are heading?
PROFESSOR LESSIG: Well, first, "Internet2"' 0 facilitates identification, but
doesn't mandate it. And "Internetl"--the one we've got right now-is capable
of certain kinds of identification, but has not yet matured to require it. Your
intuition, though, about how to think about solving the problem, I think, is a good
one. My sense of where the discussion about this is right now is that, first,
you've got to fear both bad laws and bad code. Bad laws are like the Communi-
cations Decency Act, which was wildly overbroad and imposed severe burdens
on Web sites."I That is bad law. But what we've gotten in response to the fact
that there has been no law is a lot of really terrible code. Censor-ware code, like
Cyber-sitter or Net-nanny, censors wildly beyond what you would really expect it
to be censoring, and it also keeps its censorship lists secret. If you are well-
10. See Katie Hafner, As Net Turns 30, the Sequel is Still in Progress, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1999, at GI.
II. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down certain provisions of the
Conmmunications Decency Act of 1996).
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known as a critic of any of these sites, then you'll find your own Web site on
their censored list. So, we've had no law for awhile, then we've had the market
create lots of terrible code out there that goes beyond what the legitimate interest
of the state would be. A legitimate interest of the state, it seems to me, is
understood to be empowering parents to protect their children from material
which is deemed "harmful to minors." Now, there are conceptually two ways
you might do that. One is that you could say Web sites that have material that is
deemed harmful to minors-and of course now we have to have a long
discussion about whether or not we can really figure that out-must put some
kind of identifying mark on their site. And if they did that, then the market
would develop browsers as a trivial matter that could block out all sites that have
that mark on it. So, you would have a G-rated browser that would essentially
make it so that you couldn't see any of these non-conforming sites. The other
way of doing it is that G-rated browsers would basically broadcast "this is a G-
rated browser," and so the sites would be required to block out G-rated browsers
who try to visit sites that are deemed harmful to minors. The problem with the
second solution, although it could be worked around, is that it is as if children on
the Net were waving their hands and yelling--"Here I am, a child"--and that
makes it easy for predators to prey on them. The burden of the first one, people
will say, is that the state would be telling the Web sites what they must say. It is
forced speech. Now, because I'm so concerned about bad censor-ware out there
that is doing much more censoring than the state legitimately should be, I'm less
concerned about the fact that it is the state telling Web sites what they must put
on their site. First of all, you wouldn't have to actually put it on the Web site.
It's a hidden tag. It would, basically, be in the HTML code signaling what kind
of site it is. You wouldn't be rating according to seventeen different ways of
rating. You'd only have to make a judgment in the same way that stores selling
pornography right now must make a judgment about whether their material is
subject to any number of state laws. I think there are 36 different state laws that
regulate materials harmful to minors. So, it seems to me preferable to have a
state burden that is relatively minimal, which would then facilitate a wide range
of market solutions to take advantage of this additional bit of information in
cyberspace identifying what kind of material this is-and thus facilitate people
blocking that kind of material-without also facilitating the censor-ware
companies efforts to block out people who criticize Net-nanny or Cyber-sitter,
etc.
QUESTION: I'm curious to hear your perspective on the Commerce Clause. I
have in mind the state laws and regulations that affect Internet commerce. For
example, living in Iowa it may be illegal for me to purchase wine from a
California winery. This applies to state taxes and outright state prohibitions on
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commerce that is interstate commerce for products like alcohol, cigarettes, and
gambling and other goods and services. Is this a Commerce Clause problem?
PROFESSOR LESSIG: It's a good question for everything except alcohol,
because the Twenty-first Amendment expressly reserves to the states the
authority to regulate in that area. It is not absolute, and there has been a constant
question about how to interpret it and what the scope of it is. But this is a carve-
out to the ordinary rules governing interstate commerce. Right now, what you
see is that many states have structured it so that they do permit sales into their
state from out of state. So, if you go to evineyards.com, you will have to say
where you are coming from and that will determine whether in fact they can sell
to you, depending upon whether they have these permissions from these different
states. I do think in the other areas you are talking about that the states' ability to
interfere with interstate commerce becomes much less significant to the extent
people can just use this technology to evade the taxes and the prohibitions.
PROFESSOR POST: An increasing amount of state regulation becomes at
least subject to challenge on Commerce Clause grounds. It was, of course, the
American Library Association v. Pataki12 case, which is, I think, still a sleeper in
Internet jurisprudence. I think it was an important case and is an important
opinion. It's growing, like a little mushroom. It's at the bottom of the forest
floor. It's not yet been appropriately fertilized and gone into bloom yet, but it
might. New York State had its version of the Communications Decency Act, in
effect, that prohibited Web sites from transmitting material that was "indecent,"
and the district court in that case struck it down, not on First Amendment
grounds, but on grounds that it was a violation of the Commerce Clause. It was
interfering with this national network, very much like the analogy that was made
to the interstate highway network. States cannot put-up barriers in the interstate
flow of goods and services. The district court, I think quite plausibly, interpreted
this law as such a barrier and held it unconstitutional. And I think there will be
more challenges of that kind. The dynamic is very interesting and very
complicated. At the same time there is, of course, this rebirth of federalism
politically, the whole movement for devolving more regulatory authority to the
state. And even now, within that movement, there is a small group of people
who are saying with respect to the Internet that regulatory authority should be
moved to the state capitols in a sense, insisting that would be an affirmatively
good thing. And I think it's complicated because, in a sense, I'm looking for
mechanisms to increase the diversity of rule making, if you will, to preserve the
diversity of rulemaking on the Net in the face of this enormously powerful
12. Arm Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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harmonization dynamic and internationalization. I think it would be very
important to find institutions which can build their own regulatory regimes. And
if states serve that purpose, maybe that's a good thing. But at the same time we
have a sort of end-to-end Commerce Clause notion that states shouldn't be
interfering with the movement of bits around this network. It's a complicated,
but a very important issue. I think we'll see a lot more. Those of you who are
students in the room, if you didn't pay attention to all that dormant Commerce
Clause stuff in Con Law-I understand, believe me, I understand-but go back
to it. To understand the Net, I think it will be important that we are more
conversant with the kinds of issues that the Commerce Clause raises.
PROFESSOR BAKER: We have time for one more question.
QUESTION: In terms of looking at all the issues of asserting state court sover-
eignty and thinking about the international community, as well, on the Internet,
how do you propose solving the complicated issues of personal jurisdiction?
PROFESSOR BAKER: It is time to close, we've moved from constitutional
law to civil procedure....
PROFESSOR POST: There is, of course, a constitutional dimension to
personal jurisdiction, at least in this country. I hope that question wasn't directed
at me. Did I give any idea that I would solve the problem? We can go back to
the Yahoo-Nazi memorabilia episode, I suppose. It is related, although it is not
identical to this problem of reaching out over one's borders in order to assert
your control or your power over them, your law-making power and the power of
your courts to actually grab people. Right now, the answer internationally to the
jurisdiction problem is actually quite simple. If I am a lawyer for a multinational
corporation, or a lawyer for somebody who has a Web site, which makes you
multinational in some sense, and my client were to ask me, "Am I subject to
personal jurisdiction in--name your country-Singapore because I'm on the
Net? Does that mean they can sue me for violating some Singaporean law of
which I'm not even familiar or have never even heard of?." My answer is a
relatively simple one, which is to answer the question, as always, with a question.
And the question I would ask my client is, "Do you have assets in Singapore?"
And if the answer is "no," then I would tell my client "Don't worry about
Singapore anymore." That is, as a practical matter, the answer to the jurisdiction
problem right now. If you have assets in a foreign country, they can be seized.
And the court can exercise jurisdiction. If you don't, it is far more difficult-not
impossible, but nearly impossible-under the current legal regime. I don't know
if that's a good answer or a bad answer. It's the one we have. I guess my
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instinct-Larry Lessig was talking about going slowly-this might be an area
where we do want to go slowly. We want to see how these jurisdictional rules
play out in this Internet environment. There has been a move-there is an
international convention on jurisdiction. The Hague Convention 3 on the
enforcement of judgments would allow Singapore-even if you have no assets
there-to render a judgment against you and then come to the United States and
say, "I want the courts in the United States to enforce it against you where you
reside and against your assets located in the United States." There has been an
enormous controversy, a healthy controversy, I think, about the Hague
Convention, because allowing countries to do this too easily, I think, really does
threaten some kind of balance out there on the Internet. I think that is a very
worrisome trend. Iowa and Pennsylvania have that agreement-you can get a
judgment in Iowa, you can go to Pennsylvania, and you can get my bank account.
But that's because we have a common Constitution. I mean, we agreed to that,
you and I. We need to think a bit more about it, whether we agree to that, really
and truly, in the international context or not. I am heartened by the fact that the
Hague Convention has run into all sorts of objections on both sides of the ocean,
and we are not rushing headlong into a solution of that problem. I don't think
anybody knows what the solution to that problem is.
PROFESSOR BAKER: Thank you. That brings us to the conclusion of our
Symposium this afternoon. We are out of real time. I want to draw your atten-
tion to the flyer in your materials, however, because there is going to be a follow-
up virtual Symposium, sponsored jointly by the Constitutional Law Center and
law.com, on The Constitution and the Internet. This online seminar will include
the three papers and presentations that we heard today from Professors Lessig,
Post and Rosen. These three distinguished panelists and several other prominent
commentators and lawyers will participate. Registration is free. If you are
interested in continuing today's discussion, please join us for the online seminar,
which begins February 26th. Now, please help me thank our speakers and
everyone who contributed to making this Symposium possible. Thanks again to
the Belin law firm. Thank you to Editor-in-Chief Brian Fagan and the law
review. Thank you to Linda Quinn and the staff. Most importantly, thank y'all
for attending. I hope to see you next year.
[APPLAUSE]
13. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Drafi Convention
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters <http://www.hcch.nete
/conventions/draft36e.htmj> (amended version adopted Oct. 30, 1999).
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